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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
W. P. ROGERS and
MAGNA MINING COMPANY,
a New Mexico Corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.UNITED WESTERN MINERALS
COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant a·nd Appellant.

Case
No. 8787

P·etition F'or Rehearing
By Plaintiffs and Respondents
To THE HoNORABLE, THE CHIEF JusTICE AND THE AssociATE
JusTICES oF THE SuPREME CouRT OF THE STATE oF UTAH:

The Plaintiffs and Respondents, W. P. Rogers and
Magna Mining Company, a New Mexico corporation, present this Petition for a rehearing of the above cause and
in su~port thereof respectfully show:
1. The appeal taken in this cause by the Defendants
and Appellants was argued before this Court on June
10, 1958.
1
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2. On June 30, 1958, this Court rendered its decision
remanding the cause to the trial court for further proceedings to determine, by evidence dehors the written
contract upon which the action was commenced, the intention of the parties signatory thereto, and reversing the
judgment entered by the trial court in favor of your
petitioners.
3. The Plaintiffs and Respondents seek a rehearing
for the following reasons:
A. The trial court, ruling that the contract was
unambiguous, held in favor of the Plaintiffs and Respondents. This Honorable Court reversed that ruling
and decision, declaring the contract to be ambiguous.
The Plaintiffs and Respondents, advocating affirmance of the trial court's finding did not, on appeal,
argue matters in the written contract itself which are
dispositive of the conflict which the Supreme Court has
found in those provisions to be irreconcilable.
B. The Plaintiffs and Respondents, in seeking to
secure affirmation of the trial court's decision, ''ere
justified in omitting arguments ""'hich favor a holding
of ambiguity in the terms of said contract, and therefore like,vise justified in not submitting arguments
dispositive of the ambiguity.
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully submit that
a rehearing should be had and the decision of this Honorable Court revised to affirm the holding of the trial court
2
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upon another ground or grounds, more fully treated in the
Brief in support hereof, the Petitioners respectfully believing that a re-examination of the record will result in
a revision of the decision herein and the avoidance of
multiple litigation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs and Respondents wish to advance two
reasons why a re-examination of the contract and the
total record should cause the prior decision to be revised
to affirm the trial court's result.
We acknowledge our own omission to argue these
points either forcefully or at all- but seek avoidance of
the rule that a neglectful failure of that sort might preclude a rehearing by asserting in justification of that
default that all arguments before and the judgment of
the trial court was that the contract was not ambiguous.
We do not seek by this rehearing to contradict or argue
with this Honorable Court's finding that the principal
provisions of the contract argued and examined before it
were conflicting. However, for those two reasons which
are the argumentative points of this brief, we shall
attempt to demonstrate that the ambiguity which the
Court has found is dispelled and the irreconcilability
resolved in favor of the same result as that reached by
the trial court.
It appears to us that more simplicity and clarity may
be achieved by referring to the Plaintiffs and Respondents, the petitioners herein, as the Sellers, and the Defendant and Appellant as the Buyer.
3
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STATEMENT OF
PoiNT

POINTS

I.

PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE AGREEMENT RESOLVES THE AMBIGUITY AND PREVENTS
A FORFEITURE TO SELLERS AND UNJUST
ENRICHJ\1ENT OF BUYER.
PoiNT

II.

THE INTERPRETATION PLACED BY THE
BUYER ON THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS
OF THE AGREEMENT RESOLVES ALL
DOUBT IN FAVOR OF THE SELLERS.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE AGREE~IENT RESOLVES THE AMBIGUITY AND PREVENTS
A FORFEITURE TO SELLERS AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT OF BUYER.
The Buyer, if unavailability of commercial ore is
established by further proceedings in the lower court
and is at the same time held to constitute a. defense to suit
for the purchase price, has unjustly benefited and the
Sellers have lost all title to their mining claims 'Yithout
remedy. That such 'Yas not intended, not,Yithstanding
even diametrically conflicting language in paragraph 3,
is manifested ''Tithout any obscurity, doubt, or qualification in paragraph 10 of the agreement 'Yhich reads :
In the C\"ent the buyPr fails to make the payments
for the halanre of the purchase price on the Coleman Canyon group of claims out of production
from snid claims or fails to operate and mine said
4
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group and does not pay the $500.00 per month on
the purchase price as hereinabove provided, then
and in any of such events, the sellers at their
option may retake title to all of the Coleman Canyon group of claims, in which event the buyer shall
have no further or other obligation relative
thereto, or at sellers' option, may pursue any other
legal remedy which they have against the Buyer.
This section of the contract makes no reference to commercially available ore. It states only that if the Buyer
''fails to operate and mine said gro~tp a;nd does not pa.y
the $500.00 per month on the purcha-se price" the Sellers
may retake title or sue for the purchase price. The record
is uncontradicted in that both of those conditions are
unfulfilled: Buyer has not operated and mined the Coleman group, and has not paid the $500.00 per month. If
the Buyer should argue that the phrase "as hereinabove
provided" in any way conditions the obligation to mine
and produce and pay Sellers 15% of the proceeds thereof
or respond in monthly installments the complete ans·wer is
that the reverse is true, viz. : those irreconcilable provisions in paragraph 3 are controlled by this clearly
en uncia ted option of remedies reserved to the Sellers.
Then occurs the most significant stipulation, providing that :
~ * • the payment out of production on the Coleman Canyon group of claims shall be a lien running with the title to said claims until the full P'Ur·chasp, prier is JJaid. (emphasis supplied)

which is entirely vitiated by any contention that commercially available ore is a condition precedent to recovery of
5
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either (the Sellers having the option to elect) the claims or
the purchase price since at the time of the conveyance to
Buyer either monthly or production payments were all
that remained.
Paragraph 10, we submit, must control those conflicting expressions in paragraph 3, to resolve their
ambiguity in favor of the result of the trial court for the
fundamental rule that conflicting provisions in an agreement are to be resolved by reference to unambiguous
recitals bearing thereupon. 12 Am. Jur., page 783, Contracts, Section 246, paragraph 2.
Without giving expression to paragraph 10 which is
the Sellers' remedy, the contract would operate to exact
a forfeiture against Sellers and confer an unjust benefit
upon Buyer.
PoiNT

II.

THE INTERPRETATION PLACED BY THE
BUYER ON THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS
OF THE AGREEl\1ENT RESOLVES ALL
DOUBT IN FAVOR OF THE SELLERS.
Although reference 'Yas made in the original brief of
these petitioners to the practical construction placed on
the agreement by the Buyer, its significance assumes much
greater proportion no"· that this Court has held certain
portions of the contract to contain irreconcilable terms .
.As pointed out in our original appeal brief, a letter
agreement modified the original contract by granting, at
the request of Buyer, an extension of time for the romG
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mencement of thse disputed installments. We argued that
this request was an acknowledgement of the contemplation by the Buyer that it was obligated to pay and so interpreted the contract. We argued, however, that the original agreement was unambiguous without reference to the
amendatory supplement. The Court's holding now demands, we submit, a closer analysis of exactly what was
the nature of the obligation the Buyer wished to defer
temporarily.
Here we must state that it is immaterial what language or what description the Buyer employed in its
letter to the Sellers to identify the obligation it sought
to defer. It is essential, we submit, to determine exactly
what the Buyer had agreed to do which it desired delayed. The letter amendment drawn and submitted by
the Buyer states, in the next-to-last paragraph :
The date for beginning of payments out of gross
mineral production, provided for in clause 3 of the
Agreement of August 4, 1955, will be postponed
until April 4, 1956.
The clause 3 referred to states:

* * * but there shall be no actual payment due to
sellers by buyer for six months after the date of
this agreement; however, the obligation shall
accrue during said period as to any minerals produced and marketed even though payment is delayed until six months from the date of this agreement. Thereafter, payment shall be made
monthly* * *
This six-month moratorium on all obligations of the
Buyer was the one it sought to extend for an additional
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

two months. If the contract is given the meaning contended
for it by the Buyer in this appeal, their request for this extension ca,n have no sense, meaning, or purpose whatsoever, and this is a very fine but equally momentous point:
First, consider that for purposes of this argument, at least,
the only unknown factor is the presence or absence of commercial ore. If there is ore commercially available on the
claims, then the Buyer, like any purchaser of a business
property, would like the property to pay for itself. The
Buyer here, kno,ving that it had obligated itself to pay
a balance of $125,000, wanted to delay the payments
thereon until the business property could begin liquidating its own encumbrance and requested that they be given
an additional two months, enabling them to prepare for
mining more sufficiently as well as benefit by later
weather, for commencing these payments, either out of
production or on a minimum basis. If ore could be mined,
then the Buyer only had to pay to Sellers 15% of the
gross value of production, even if that amounted to substantially less than $500.00 per month. Thus commencement of actual mining - meaning actual production of
minerals- would satisfy the obligation of the Buyer (R.,
page 4, para. 3 of the Contract and R., page 104 and page
9 of Appellant's original brief).

On the other hand, if the contract is interpreted the
"~ay the Buyer nou~ contends, assume either one of the two
possibilities, i. e., presence of ore or absence of ore, and
no useful consequence can be attached to the amendment
proposed by the Buyer. First, if there is commercial ore
present they are going to be, even under their theory,
8
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obliged to pay the full purchase price, so the time or
manner of payment would be immaterial. If ore were
not available in commercial quanties, and if as they have
urged it is a condition precedent to recovery, then they
could have waited five years or even more to make a determination of that, arnd still have absolutely no liability.
If their view were adopted and it ever is determined conclusively that ores cannot be developed commercially at
the properties in question, the finding would relate back
to April 4, 1956, and not only would the Buyer be excused
from liability for the purchase price, but also the Sellers
could not recover their property. That is the defense Buyer
has asserted. Thus, under either circumstance, that is
either with the presence of ore, or with the absence of ore,
the Buyer could have had absolutely no purpose or objective in requesting and obtaining an extension of the moratorium on monthly payments of the balance unless the
Buyer had been confident that it had an unqualified obligation to pay something each month under either condition, either $500.00 per month or 15% of an actual mining
operation.
This is the contemporaneous and practical construction placed upon the agreement by the Buyer which should
resolve any ambiguity found in the principal terms of
the contract. Hardinge Company v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah
2d 320, 266 p. 2d 494.
Stated succinctly, the Buyer viewed the contract precisely as we are now urging it to be construed by this
Court: If the obligation to mine or pay monthly install9
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ments was unqualified, they could benefit by deferring
those payments an additional two months. This benefit
they sought and obtained (R. 29). If they had believed
the contract to mean what they now contend it does, the
extension could be of no benefit because if commercial ore
were a condition upon recovery of the purchase price,
they would have had no obligation at any time; that fact
would have had relation back to execution of the contract
and excused further performance.
That the first time the Buyer has contended that
commercial ore is a condition precedent to its obligation
was in this lawsuit is clearly illustrated by their action in
requesting and obtaining an extension of the first due
date for a monthly installment.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully petition this Court for a rehearing
and re-examination upon the record and the contract, believing that the Court might have some questions,
answers to which counsel may assist the Court in reaching.
Respectfully submitted~

OLSEN and CHAMBERLAIN
Richfield, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Resporulents
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